Bornlake’s Counter-Drone Technology: Seungjoon Lee and Yeongwoo Lee on South Korean Security and Lessons from Ukraine

By Scott Douglas Jacobsen

The rapid evolution of drone warfare has made counter-drone technology an increasingly important component of national security, critical infrastructure protection, and civilian defence. Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated how unmanned aerial systems can reshape modern combat, placing new demands on detection, electronic countermeasures, and integrated defence capabilities.

For South Korea, these developments carry particular strategic significance. North Korea’s military involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine has raised concerns about the battlefield experience its personnel could acquire, including knowledge of drone operations and modern electronic warfare.

In an interview with Scott Douglas Jacobsen, Seungjoon Lee, Chief Executive Officer of Bornlake Co., Ltd., and Yeongwoo Lee, the company’s Chief Technology Officer, discuss the technologies being developed to counter unauthorized drones, the relationship between electronic countermeasures and conventional interception systems, and the broader implications of drone warfare for South Korean security.

Their perspectives also highlight a wider issue for international security: how technological innovation, cooperation among democratic partners, and a shared commitment to protecting human life can contribute to more effective defensive capabilities.

Meet Bornlake’s Leadership

Seungjoon Lee leads Bornlake, a South Korean company developing counter-drone systems. His background includes cybersecurity research, hardware security, reverse engineering, and FPGA-based cryptographic systems. He holds a PhD from Korea University and has spoken at Black Hat conferences on multiple occasions. His technical experience informs Bornlake’s work at the intersection of radio-frequency technology, cryptography, and security.

Yeongwoo Lee serves as Bornlake’s Chief Technology Officer, overseeing the company’s technological development. His areas of specialization include signal processing, security architecture, and product engineering.

Bornlake develops radio-frequency-based technologies designed to detect, identify, track, and counter unauthorized drones. Its approach combines communications analysis with electronic countermeasures intended to disrupt or influence a drone’s operation.

Radio-Frequency Technology and the Counter-Drone Challenge

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: What are your respective areas of specialization at Bornlake?

Yeongwoo Lee: Bornlake is a South Korean company that develops and supplies counter-drone solutions.

Seungjoon Lee: We specialize in radio-frequency technology, cryptography, and cybersecurity.

Our counter-drone solution combines the detection of drone communications with countermeasures, including spoofing and targeted jamming. Our approach involves directing signals at a hostile drone with precise frequency selection and timing. These are our core technologies.

The combination of communications analysis and electronic countermeasures reflects a broader shift in defence technology. Counter-drone systems increasingly need to address not only the physical presence of an unmanned aircraft but also the communications and control mechanisms that enable it to operate.

For defence planners, this creates an important requirement: technologies must be evaluated as part of an integrated security architecture rather than as isolated products.

Soft-Kill and Hard-Kill Approaches to Drone Defence

Jacobsen: When people think about counter-drone technology, they often imagine one drone intercepting and destroying another. But the field is broader than that. What does counter-drone technology mean to your company?

Yeongwoo Lee: We think of it as technology that prevents a drone from operating.

Counter-drone technologies are commonly divided into two categories: soft kill and hard kill. In our view, an effective counter-drone capability requires a combination of these approaches.

Soft-kill methods use electronic or other non-destructive measures to interfere with a drone’s operation. Depending on the system and circumstances, these measures may disrupt communications, manipulate navigation or control signals, or cause the drone to land or return.

Hard-kill systems seek to physically disable or destroy a drone. Depending on the threat, these may include interception systems, nets, or directed-energy technologies.

The choice between these approaches depends on the operational environment, the characteristics of the incoming threat, and the potential consequences of engaging it. In populated areas or near critical infrastructure, limiting collateral damage can be an especially important consideration.

Countering Iranian-Designed Drones and Integrating Defence Systems

Jacobsen: What approaches are effective against Iranian-designed drones, including the designs used by Russia?

Yeongwoo Lee: For military drones whose communications protocols are unavailable to us, accessing and exploiting those protocols is difficult. In those circumstances, an approach is to identify the drone using radar or cameras and then employ a hard-kill method, such as a laser or a net launcher.

Seungjoon Lee: Combining different approaches is particularly important in warfare. We may not know whether a particular drone is using wireless communications.

For drones that our system can address, we see RF-based countermeasures as an economical option. We also see advantages in avoiding physical destruction and reducing the associated risk of collateral damage.

I would not say that RF-based countermeasures are universally better than hard-kill systems. The important point is to combine capabilities. That applies to the Russian and Iranian drones you mentioned.

The distinction is significant for countries seeking to strengthen their air-defence capabilities. No single counter-drone technology can be expected to address every platform, operating method, or battlefield condition.

A layered approach can combine surveillance, identification, electronic warfare, and physical interception to improve the ability to respond to different types of threats. Ukraine’s experience of large-scale drone warfare has made the need for adaptable and cost-effective defensive systems particularly relevant to international security discussions.

For South Korea and its partners, the challenge is to develop capabilities that can respond to evolving threats while accounting for operational costs, civilian safety, and the protection of strategically important infrastructure.

North Korea’s Battlefield Experience and South Korea’s Security

Jacobsen: North Korea has sent troops to support Russia’s war against Ukraine. Those who survive and return home can bring experience of modern warfare with them. Does that create an immediate security concern for South Korea, particularly through their knowledge of drone warfare?

Seungjoon Lee: That is a very important point. They are learning how drones and drone systems are used tactically on the battlefield. I consider that dangerous for South Korea.

The South Korean military recognizes this concern, and it has been discussed within government.

However, South Korea is not currently engaged in active warfare. Although we anticipate that these capabilities could have serious consequences if North Korea used them in a conflict or an attack, that scenario has not materialized here.

My assessment is that discussion of this particular risk has not yet translated into dedicated budget allocations.

The exchange of battlefield experience between Russia and North Korea raises questions that extend beyond troop deployments. Modern conflicts provide opportunities to observe drone tactics, electronic warfare, battlefield surveillance, and the integration of unmanned systems into military operations.

For South Korea, assessing these developments requires attention to both the immediate security environment and the possibility that lessons learned in Ukraine could influence future military planning on the Korean Peninsula.

The implications also extend to international defence cooperation. Countries confronting similar technological threats can benefit from exchanging assessments, evaluating emerging countermeasures, and examining how operational experience can inform defensive planning.

Ukraine’s experience is particularly relevant because of the scale at which drones have been deployed and the speed with which both offensive systems and countermeasures have evolved during the war.

Shared Democratic Values and International Defence Cooperation

Jacobsen: South Korea is known for its scientific and technological capabilities. I believe its support, whether through software or hardware, would be valuable to Ukraine’s defence of its territory.

People also use the term “the West,” but geography does not adequately describe the relationships involved. Shared commitments to democratic government, the rule of law, and other common values connect countries such as South Korea, Japan, Ukraine, and Canada.

People can look different and speak different languages while sharing those values. How does your business connect with them?

Seungjoon Lee: Preserving peace is probably one of our most widely shared values.

In that sense, our counter-drone solution focuses on defence rather than destruction. Our soft-kill approach is intended to make a drone return or land where it is, rather than destroy it.

We see that as a way to provide protection while limiting destruction. That is how we believe our technology contributes to peace.

The discussion points to a broader role for technological innovation in international security. Defensive capabilities can support the protection of civilian populations and critical infrastructure while helping governments respond to emerging threats.

For Ukraine, cooperation with technologically advanced partners such as South Korea could contribute to the exchange of expertise and the development of defensive solutions. For South Korea, the lessons emerging from the war in Ukraine offer an opportunity to examine how modern drone threats develop in practice and how defensive systems can adapt.

Such cooperation can be considered within a wider framework of strategic partnerships, technological exchange, and shared security interests. Any specific collaboration, however, would depend on the relevant parties, applicable regulations, and their respective policy and operational requirements.

Bornlake’s Mission: Protecting People Through Counter-Drone Innovation

Jacobsen: What is the bigger picture for Bornlake?

Yeongwoo Lee: Bornlake develops counter-drone solutions.

Drones have become powerful weapons in warfare. We expect the threats associated with them to increasingly affect ordinary people as well.

For drones operated through radio communications, the control signals are invisible. Our work focuses on analysing and controlling those signals and finding ways to respond.

Protecting people’s lives through that work is our central goal.

Jacobsen: Thank you both for your time.

Implications for International Security

The conversation with Bornlake’s leadership underscores several issues relevant to policymakers, defence-sector stakeholders, and international partners.

First, counter-drone defence increasingly depends on integrating different technologies. Radio-frequency countermeasures can offer an alternative to physical interception in suitable circumstances, but their effectiveness depends on the target system and operational environment. A layered defence architecture remains essential.

Second, the experience gained during Russia’s war against Ukraine has implications for security beyond Europe. The spread of drone tactics and countermeasures creates a need for continued assessment, information exchange, and adaptation among countries facing evolving military threats.

Third, protecting civilians must remain a central consideration in the development and deployment of defensive technologies. Electronic countermeasures may help limit physical destruction in some situations, although their use can also present risks, including interference with other communications and navigation systems.

Finally, the development of defensive technologies provides an opportunity to strengthen international dialogue between governments, technical experts, and private-sector innovators. Engagement among partners can support a more informed understanding of emerging threats and the capabilities required to address them.

Bornlake’s approach, as described by Seungjoon Lee and Yeongwoo Lee, places radio-frequency technology and electronic countermeasures within this wider security context. Their emphasis on combining defensive capabilities and protecting human life reflects a challenge shared by countries seeking to respond to the changing character of modern warfare.

About the Author

Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a Canadian journalist, publisher, editor, and interviewer whose work explores diplomacy, law, human rights, science, secularism, culture, and contemporary international affairs. He is also a Coordinator at Diplomatic Legal Hub.