Trump Signed the Russia Sanctions Law. What Changes for Ukraine?

Between Capitals with Alex Chen

President Trump has signed a new Russia sanctions law. But his signature does not answer the question that matters next: What will actually change for Ukraine?

On September 18, Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. Two days later, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said they had agreed to meet in New York during the United Nations General Assembly. White House announcement; ABC News.

Washington is expanding its powers to apply economic pressure while continuing diplomacy. Those two tracks are moving together. What remains unclear is how they will interact.

Sanctions and diplomacy

On September 21, the Financial Times reported that Trump had urged Zelenskyy to stop attacks on Russian refineries, citing concerns about diesel supplies and prices. The report also described Ukraine’s willingness to consider a reciprocal ceasefire covering energy infrastructure, provided partners could ensure Russian compliance. Financial Times.

That introduces an important distinction. Stopping attacks on Russia’s energy facilities is one proposal. A reciprocal arrangement protecting energy infrastructure in both countries is another. They involve different commitments, different risks, and different questions about verification.

A willingness to discuss reciprocal restraint is not confirmation of an agreement. Nor does discussing an agreement, by itself, suspend the sanctions law.

This is where the political story becomes more complicated than the signing announcement. Sanctions restrict economic relationships involving Russia and its customers. Attacks on infrastructure affect physical production. Negotiations concern what each side might stop doing and what it expects in return.

These are different instruments, and their effects need to be assessed separately.

What the signature does—and does not—do

What powers does the new law provide?

The package covers Russian officials, financial institutions, energy activities, and Russia’s external support networks. It provides for tariffs of up to 500% on goods imported from Russia and up to 100% on goods from qualifying countries connected to Russian energy purchases or oil-sanctions evasion. Legislative text, Sections 102–113.

But “up to” is doing important work here. These figures are ceilings, rather than a single tariff rate automatically imposed everywhere when Trump signed the law. The countries covered, the rates selected, and the reasons for those decisions still matter.

As of September 21, the September press releases published by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative did not identify a country-specific tariff schedule implementing the law. USTR September press releases.

That limits what can be confirmed from those announcements. It is not proof that nothing is happening behind the scenes.

Many initial measures are due within 30 days of enactment, making October 18 an early checkpoint. The law also contains conditions, exceptions, and presidential waiver provisions that require an explanation to Congress. Legislative text, Sections 102–115.

There are therefore three separate things to follow: what the law requires, what the administration does, and what changes afterward.

A high tariff does not automatically prove that the policy is achieving its objective. A lower rate does not automatically prove that pressure has disappeared. Assessing the outcome requires examining both the decision and the response.

An example from Treasury

A Treasury announcement issued on the same day as the signing illustrates why these distinctions matter.

On September 18, Treasury updated a limited authorization concerning the possible sale of Lukoil International’s overseas assets. This was part of an existing sanctions program, rather than a new measure implementing the Graham law. Treasury announcement.

The authorization allows negotiations and entry into certain conditional contracts until 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time on October 22, 2026. It does not authorize completion of a sale, which would require separate approval from Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC. General License 131J.

Treasury says any proposed sale would be evaluated against conditions including severing ties with Lukoil and blocking funds owed to the sanctioned company. OFAC guidance.

The distinction is straightforward: permission to negotiate is not permission to complete a transaction, and a limited authorization is not the same as removing sanctions.

Without that distinction, the same announcement could be presented as either a major concession or business as usual, without explaining what actually changed.

The next three to six months

What can Ukraine assess over the next three to six months?

By December, an initial assessment can examine implementation. Which restrictions were applied? What explanations accompanied waivers or tariff decisions? Did the affected governments and companies change their conduct?

By around March 2027, the question becomes more demanding: What happened to the activity the law was intended to restrict?

Did revenue decline? Did transactions stop or move through different intermediaries? Did purchasing patterns change?

These are questions to investigate with evidence.

Consider a hypothetical example. A country buys less Russian oil, but global oil prices rise. Russia’s revenue might not fall in the same proportion as the volume sold.

Or a sanctioned intermediary closes while another company takes over its transactions. The original target has been disrupted, but the underlying activity may continue.

That is why counting announcements is not enough to measure consequences.

March is an analytical checkpoint, not a universal legal deadline. Some reviews are timed from the initial implementation of particular measures rather than the signing date. The law also does not itself provide a new package of military assistance or reconstruction funding for Ukraine. Those remain separate decisions. Legislative text.

For Ukraine, the next chapter therefore involves both implementation and diplomacy. What restrictions are applied? What conditions accompany relief? How do those choices relate to the commitments being discussed with Kyiv and Moscow?

As of September 21, only three days had passed since the signing. That is too early to establish the law’s effects on Russia’s war economy or negotiating position. But it is enough time to identify what to monitor:

• October: Implementation.
• December: Responses from affected governments and companies.
• March 2027: Evidence of changes in the underlying activity.

These are checkpoints, not promises of a settlement.

The signature changed the law. Implementation will show how Washington uses it. The evidence will show what it changes.